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NOTES AND COMMENTS
breach of contract actions. As in the case of any new development in
the law, the process is one of slow and cautious growth, but at some
future time the "general rule" may be swallowed up by the exceptions
and the exceptions may become the rule.
CHARLEs E. KNox.
Domestic Relations-Custody of Child-
Rights of Natural Parent
One of the greatest responsibilities that can be placed upon a court
is that of determining the proper custodian of a child. This is not a field
of the law suited to the application of fixed rules or maxims, but rather
one in which the courts should carefully weigh all the individual and
social interests involved. These include the ultimate welfare of the
child, the natural emotions of the parent and the interest of the state.-
The North Carolina Supreme Court in the recent case of In re Cran-
ford2 appears to have reached its decision without giving careful thought
to all the individual and social interests involved. In that case, a habeas
corpus proceeding was instituted by the mother of an illegitimate child
to regain the child's custody from the mother's aunt. The lower court
found that shortly after the birth of the child, the mother and the child
went to the home of the mother's aunt and remained there until the
mother's subsequent marriage to a person not the father of the child;
that the mother then established residence elsewhere, abandoning the
child by surrendering it to the unqualified custody of the aunt and as-
serting that she would make no further claim to it. It was further found
that the aunt was a fit person to have the custody of the child and that
her home was a proper place to rear it; and that the mother of the child
was a woman of good character and that her home was a proper place
for the child to visit. Upon these findings the lower court awarded the
custody and control of the child to the aunt, allowing the mother to visit
the child at stated periods.
The Supreme Court on appeal reversed on the grounds that they
were not bound by the lower court's finding that there was an abandon-
ment by the mother, and that the natural parent, unless shown to be
unfit, has a legal right to the possession of the child.
One wonders what effect this and like decisions8 will have on the
willingness of persons to take helpless children into their homes in the
1 Sce Commonwealth v. Lindsay, 156 Pa. Super. 560, 562, 40 A. 2d 881, 882
(1944) ("Lacking prescience, the choice is always difficult") ; Commonwealth v.
Shannon, 107 Pa. Super. 557, 164 Atl. 352 (1933).2231 N. C. 91, 56 S. E. 2d 35 (1949).
'In another recent case, 1n re Adoption of Doe, 231 N. C. 1, 56 S. E. 2d 8
(1949), the mother of an illegitimate child consented to its adoption; she married
the reputed father; a temporary adoption order was entered; and then the mother
revoked her consent. The court held that the child must be returned to the parents
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future. They might well fear that the child will be taken from them
after they have cared for and become attached to it. The willingness
of persons to take in and provide for helpless children affects the wel-
fare of the child and society. There are many institutions provided to
care for these unfortunates; but beneficial and commendable as they
may be, they can never take the place of private homes where, from close
personal contact and cooperation, mutual love and affection develop
between the children and those persons standing in loco parentis.
4
At common law, the child was regarded somewhat as a chattel and
the property interest of the parent was paramount to the welfare of the
child.5 The modern American rule, however, is contrary to that com-
mon law principle and now the child's welfare is said to be controlling.0
As stated by Roscoe Pound, 7 "Recent legislation and judicial decisions
have changed the old attitude of the law with respect to dependent mem-
bers of the household. Courts no longer make the rights of parents with
respect to children the chief basis of their decisions. The individual
interests of parents which used to be the one thing regarded has come
to be almost the last thing regarded as compared with the interests of
the child and the interests of society. In other words, here also social
interests are chiefly regarded."
In the principal case, the preferred status of the parent prevailed.
Modern courts, although recognizing the welfare of the child as the
ultimate consideration, tend to prefer the natural parents. The basis
of such preference is a presumption that the natural affections of the
parent for its child will result in the child receiving better care from
the parents than from strangers.8 Still, such a presumption is rather
effectively rebutted where the parent has failed to care tenderly for the
child in the past.9 Therefore, when a parent voluntarily parts with the
custody of the child for an unreasonable length of time and allows an-
other to perform the parental duties that the parent should have per-
"See Waite, The Adoption and Rearing of Children, 21 PA. B. A. Q. 40, 43
(1949).
Commonwealth v. Tracy, 155 Pa. Super. 257, 38 A. 2d 405 (1944).
'See Keener v. Keener, 139 Tenn. 211, 221, 201 S. W. 779, 782 (1918) ("The
dominant thought is that children are not chattels, but intelligent and moral beings,
and that as such their -welfare and their happiness is a matter of first considera-
tion.") ; Seeley v. Seeley, 30 App. D. C. 191 (1907), cert. denied, 209 U. S. 544
(1908) (Rationale: the state must perpetuate itself and good citizenship is essential
to that end.) ; Commonwealth v. Stephens, 127 Pa. Super. 188, 193 Atl. 80 (1937) ;
State v. Postletehwaite, 106 W. Va. 383, 145 S. E. 738 (1928) ; MADDEN, PERSONS
AND DOMEsTic RELATO Ns 371 (1931)- and cases cited.
'PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE Co m oN LAW 189 (1921).
' Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); see Buchanan v. Buchanan, 93 Kan.
613, 616, 144 Pac. 840, 841 (1914) ; MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOiuESTic RELATIONS
372 (1931).
'Peese v. Gullerman, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 39, 110 S. W. 196 (1908).
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formed, that parent thereby seriously impairs his right to have the child's
custody awarded him by judicial decree.10
It is somewhat surprising that the North Carolina Court based its
decision on the sole ground that the natural right of the parent is su-
perior, absent proof of the mother's unfitness, inasmuch as North Caro-
lina has frequently recognized and followed the almost unanimous
American rule that the welfare of the child is the controlling factor.1 1
In fact, the best interest of the child has prevailed over the natural right
of the parent in many North Carolina cases even though the parent was
not shown to be unfit.12
Recognizing the welfare of the child as the objective to be obtained,
no consideration bearing on its welfare should be overlooked. In the
principal case, there is no indication that the court considered the length
of time the child was in the custody of the aunt-a vital factor. "It is
an obvious fact, that the ties of blood weaken, and ties of companion-
ship strengthen, by lapse of time; and the prosperity and welfare of the
child depend on the number and strength of these ties, as well as on
the ability to do all which the promptings of these ties compel.' 3
In addition to considering the length of time the aunt had custody
of the child, the court should have weighed the conduct of the parties
during that period.' 4 The actions of the mother during that period
10 Commonwealth v. Stephens, 127 Pa. Super. 188, 193 Atl. 80 (1937) ; Hoxie
v. Potter, 16 R. I. 374, 17 Att. 129 (1888) ; Cunningham v. Barnes, 37 W. Va. 746,
17 S. E. 308 (1893).
1 "It is also held with us in well considered cases, and they are in accord With
the rule now generally prevailing, that the right of the parents is not universal
and absolute; but even as between individuals, the same may be modified and
disregarded when it is made to appear that the welfare of the child clearly requires
it." Atkinson v. Downing, 175 N. C. 244, 95 S. E. 487 (1918) ; Hardee v. Mitchell,
230 N. C. 40, 51 S. E. 2d 884 (1949) ; Ridenhour v. Ridenhour, 225 N. C. 508,
35 S. E. 2d 617 (1945) ; Walker v. Walker, 224 N. C. 751, 32 S. E. 2d 318 (1944) ;
Pappas v. Pappas and Elkin v. Pappas, 208 N. C. 220, 179 S. E. 661 (1935) ; Clegg
v. Clegg, 186 N. C. 28, 118 S. E. 824 (1923) ; In re Rosa Hamilton, 182 N. C. 44,
108 S. E. 385 (1921) ; Brickwell v. Hines, 179 N. C. 254, 102 S. E. 309 (1920) ;
In re Alderman, 157 N. C. 507, 73 S. E. 126 (1911) ; In re Constance Turner, 151
N. C. 474, 66 S. E. 431 (1909).
"Atkinson v. Downing, supra note 11; Tyner v. Tyner, 206 N. C. 776, 175
S. E. 144 (1934) ; In re Daisey Bell Warren, 178 N. C. 43, 100 S. E. 76 (1919).
Contra: In re Jones, 153 N. C. 312, 69 S. E. 217 (1910).
In the principal case the court based its decision, that the mother was not
shown to be unfit, on the fact that the lower court found her of proper character
for the child to visit. In Tyner v. Tyner the lower court found the mother to
be a woman of good character, and a proper and suitable person for the children
to associate with, but nevertheless failed to find that she was a suitable person for
their custody.
1 Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) (leading case).
1. . . the conduct of the father, during nearly the whole life of the child,
furnishes reason for supposing that he surrendered his rights over the child by a
tacit understanding, if not by an express agreement. He has, for eight years or
more, been able to retake the child, and has made no offer to do so. No demand
or offer has been made that he should contribute to her support. His present
assertion of his rights is in consequence of -what he deems an unreasonable refusal
of a different request. By his own acquiesence he has allowed the affections on
1950]
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might have amounted to a willful disregard for the welfare of her
child. 1  On the other hand, a study of her conduct might have shown
that the natural ties of affection were present, but that a temporary
relinquishment of custody was necessary for economic or other justi-
fiable reasons.
16
Another factor the court failed to take into account was the attitude
and character of the husband of the child's mother, which would seem
to have a direct and important bearing on the future welfare of the
child.1
7
Many courts are influenced by the preference or desire of the child
if the child has reached the "age of discretion."' 8 The court listens to
the wishes of the child because it is material for the court to understand
them, that it may be better prepared to exercise its discretion wisely. It
is not the whim or caprice of the child which the court respects, but its
feelings, its attachments, its reasonable preference and its probable con-
tentment.10 The "age of discretion" is fixed by statute in some states,20
but ordinarily it is left to the judgment of the trial court which deter-
mines it by appraising the capacity, information, intelligence and judg-
ment of the child.21
Other vital elements that should enter into the determination of the
award22 are the health,23 age,24 sex,2 ; pecuniary prospects, 20 education
both sides to become engaged in a manner he could not but have anticipated, and
which cannot be altered without risking the happiness and interests of his child.
He has allowed the parties to go on for years in the belief that his legal rights
were waived. Therefore he is not now in a position to require the interference
of the court in favor of a controlling legal right on his part, against the rights,
such as they are, the feelings, and the interests of the parties." Hoxie v. Potter,
16 R. I. 374, 17 Atl. 129 (1888).
. Society v. Davis, 211 Ala. 344, 100 So. 325 (1924); Lancey v. Shelley, 232
Iowa 178, 2 N. W. 2d 781 (1942) ; Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
"Wood v. Shaw, 92 Kan. 70, 139 Pac. 1165 (1914).
1 This factor would seem to be especially relevant here inasmuch as the mother
of the child had already married at the time she relinquished custody to the aunt.
See In re Daisey Bell Warren, 178 N. C. 43, 100 S. E. 76 (1919) ; Bonnett v.
Bonnett, 61 Iowa 199, 16 N. W. 91 (1883) (court considered fact that stepfather
was under no legal obligation to provide for child). See State v. Dewey, 195 N. C.
628, 143 S. E. 216 (1928) (stepfather has no legal obligation to provide for
child).
19 See Harris v. Harris, 115 N. C. 587, 589, 20 S. E. 187, 188 (1894) ; Spears
v. Snell, 74 N. C. 210, 215 (1876); Bridges v. Matthews, 276 Ky. 59, 122 S. W.
2d 1021 (1938) ; Cummings v. Bird, 230 Ky. 296, 19 S. W. 2d 959 (1929) ; Com-
monwealth v. Wilcox, 319 Pa. 183, 179 Atl. 808 (1935).
19 HuRD, HABEAS CORPUS 529 (1858).
"0E.g. OHio GEN. CODE ANN. §8033 (1938) (14 years).
21 HURD, HABEAS CoRpus 532 (1858).
22 Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW AND CONTE7tP. PROD.
721, 734 (1944)."in re Rosa Hamilton, 182 N. C. 44, 108 S. E. 385 (1921); See Note, 48
A. L. R. 137 (1927) and cases cited.
2, In the principal case, there is no mention of the age of the child. The parent
would seem to have a stronger case where the child is of tender years. See Scog-
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and development,27 and religious welfare of the child28 and in addition,
the character and feelings of the parties desiring custody.29  Further-
more, a decision in this type of case involves judicial discretion. Being
familiar with the surrounding circumstances, hearing the testimony,
seeing the witnesses, and interviewing the child are all matters which
place the trial court in a better position to determine what is for the
child's best interest, and its decision should not be lightly overturned.3 0
In the light of the above discussion, it is submitted that a parent
should not be denied the custody of his child without a good and suffi-
cient cause, but in determining whether such cause does in fact exist,
all factors affecting the welfare of the child should be considered.
RODDEY M. LIGON, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Removal-Separate and Independent
Claim or Cause of Action
Suit divisibility as a basis for removal to the federal courts has long
been available to non-resident defendants who were joined with resident
defendants in a single action. The act of July 27, 1866, brought into
being the right of these defendants to remove on the ground of "sepa-
rable controversy."' At this time the case was split into two parts, with
the part involving the non-resident defendant removed to the federal
court and the part involving the resident defendant left in the state
court. It was not until the act of March 3, 1875, that the removal of
the entire suit was allowed where a "separable controversy" was found
to exist.2 Under the last act the court was permitted, upon removal, to
remand in whole or in part as justice required. This last revision con-
tinued in substantially the same form until September 1, 1948.3 During
gins v. Scoggins, 80 N. C. 319 (1897); Haskell v. Haskell, 152 Mass. 16, 24 N. E.
859 (1890).
" See Scoggins v. Scoggins, supra note 24, where three girls awarded to mother
and one boy to father.
- Lancey v. Shelley, 232 Iowa 187, 2 N. W. 2d 781 (1942) ; Dunkin v. Siefert,
123 Iowa 64, 98 N. W. 558 (1904) ; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 93 Kan. 613, 144 Pac.
840 (1914) ; Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Cuistody, 10 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PRoB. 721, 733 (1944).
"'See Spears v. Snell, 74 N. C. 210, 213 (1876); Dunkin v. Siefert, supra
note 26.
" Atkinson v. Downing, 175 N. C. 244, 95 S. E. 487 (1918) ; Moore v. Dozier,
128 Ga. 90, 57 S. E. 110 (1907) ; Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the
Religious Education of a Child, 29 HAxv. L. R. 485, 488 (1916).
20 Sheers v. Stein, 75 Wis. 44, 43 N. W. 728 (1889).
Pappas v. Pappas and Elkin v. Pappas, 208 N. C. 220, 197 S. E. 661 (1935);
Clegg v. Clegg, 186 N. C. 28, 118 S. E. 824 (1923); In re Rosa Gray Hamilton,
182 N. C. 44, 108 S. E. 385 (1921) ; Stokes v. Cogdell, 153 N. C. 181, 69 S. E. 65
(1910) ; Pra v. Gherardini, 34 N. Mex. 587, 286 Pac. 828 (1930).'14 STAT. 306 (1866).
18 STAT. 470 (1875).
136 STAT. 1094 (1911). "And when in any suit mentioned in this section there
shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and
19501
